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The UNGPs in the European Union: The Open Coordination of 
Business and Human Rights? 
 
Abstract 
The article examines the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
(UNGPs) in the European Union via National Action Plans (NAPs). We argue that some of the 
shortcomings currently observed in the implementation process could effectively be addressed through 
the Open Method of Coordination – a governance instrument already used by the EU in other policy 
domains. The article sketches out the polycentric global governance approach envisaged by the UNGPs 
and discusses the institutional and policy background of their implementation in the EU. It provides an 
assessment of EU member states’ NAPs on business and human rights, as benchmarked against 
international NAP guidance, before relating experiences with the existing NAP process to the policy 
background and rationale of the OMC and considering the conditions for employing the OMC in the 
business and human rights domain. Building on a recent opinion of the EU Fundamental Rights Agency, 
the article concludes with a concrete proposal for developing an OMC on business and human rights in 
the European Union. 
 
In June 2016 the Council of the European Union (EU) published its ‘Conclusions on 
Business and Human Rights’,1 marking the 5th anniversary of the endorsement of the 
United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) by the 
United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council.2 The UNGPs are the first universally 
accepted global framework on business and human rights, developed by Professor 
John Ruggie in his capacity as Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the 
issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business entities 
(SRSG).3 The UNGPs consist of three pillars that build on the SRSG’s ‘Protect, Respect 
and Remedy’ Framework: (i) the state duty to protect human rights against violations by 
third parties, including corporations; (ii) the corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights, meaning to act with due diligence to avoid infringing the rights of others; and (iii) 
greater access to effective remedies, both judicial and non-judicial, for victims of 
corporate human rights abuse. Following the end of the SRSG’s mandate in 2011, a UN 
Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Entities was established to promote the ‘effective and comprehensive 
                                                   
1  Council of the EU, ‘Council Conclusions on Business and Human Rights’, 3477th meeting of the Foreign 
Affairs Council, 10254/16 (20 June 2016). 
2  Human Rights Council, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations’ “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’, A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2011). 
3  For a more detailed account of the evolution of the UNGPs, see Pierre Thielbörger and Tobias Ackermann, 
‘A Treaty on Enforcing Human Rights Against Business: Closing the Loophole or Getting Stuck in a Loop?’ (2017) 
24:1 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 43, 46–53. 
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dissemination and implementation’ of the UNGPs.4 The Working Group has inter alia 
encouraged states and other relevant stakeholders to develop National Action Plans 
(NAPs) on business and human rights.5 NAPs are policy documents in which states 
outline strategies and instruments to comply with their duty to prevent and redress 
corporate-related human rights abuse, as laid down in international human rights law 
and restated in the first and the third pillar of the UNGPs.  
Reiterating the European Union’s support of the UN Guiding Principles, the 2016 
Council Conclusions on Business and Human Rights welcome the European 
Commission’s intention to develop an EU Action Plan on Responsible Business 
Conduct that should outline an overall European policy framework to enhance the 
further implementation of the UNGPs.6 The Council notes in its Conclusions that ‘EU 
Member States have taken the lead internationally on developing and adopting National 
Action Plans to implement the Guiding Principles or integrating [them] into national 
[Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)] Strategies’. In this regard, it encourages the 
European Commission and the European External Action Service ‘to promote peer 
learning on business and human rights, including cross-regional peer learning’.7 Already 
in 2011, the European Commission had adopted a new strategy for corporate social 
responsibility in line with the second pillar of the UNGPs.8 To comply with their duty to 
protect (first pillar of the UNGPs), EU member states were tasked to develop by the end 
of 2012 national plans for the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles. This request 
was reiterated in the Council of the European Union’s 2012 and 2015 Action Plans on 
                                                   
4  Human Rights Council, ‘Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Entities’, 
A/HRC/RES/17/4 (6 July 2011). 
5  UN Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Working Group on the issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and other Business Enterprises’, A/69/263 (6 August 2014). 
6  See Council of the EU, note 1, para 6. 
7  Ibid, para 5. A peer review process was already established to promote the development of NAPs on CSR, 
which led to the publication of a CSR Compendium in 2014, see European Commission, Corporate Social 
Responsibility: National Public Policies in the European Union: Compendium 2014 (Luxembourg: EU, 2014). The 
European Commission has furthermore organized pilot peer reviews on business and human rights in seven EU 
member states. The reports are available at the European Commission’s webpage, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/keyDocuments.jsp?advSearchKey=CSRprreport&mode=advancedSubmit&langId=en&po
licyArea=&type=0&country=0&year=0 (accessed 13 April 2017).  
8  European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 
for Corporate Social Responsibility’, COM(2011) 681 final (25 October 2011). 
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Human Rights and Democracy, with the deadline for member state NAPs being 
extended to 2017.9 Following the Commission’s initiative, a number of member states 
developed National Action Plans prior to the UN Working Group publishing its official 
NAP guidance in December 2014.10 At present, eight EU member states have released 
NAPs on business and human rights (the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark, 
Finland, Lithuania, Sweden, Italy and Germany) and eight further member states have 
produced drafts or have initiated a NAP process (the Czech Republic, France, Greece, 
Ireland, Latvia, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain).11 The majority of member states have 
furthermore published NAPs on CSR that also refer to human rights.12 In terms of 
quantity if not quality, this makes the European Union a global leader in developing 
NAPs on business and human rights. 
The article examines the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights in the European Union via National Action Plans. We argue that 
some of the shortcomings currently observed in the implementation process could 
effectively be addressed through the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) – a 
governance instrument that the EU has already successfully used in other policy 
domains such as employment, social protection and education. The use of the OMC 
was recommended in an Opinion of the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) 
published on 10 April 2017, providing a further reason to scientifically explore its 
potential and feasibility in the business and human rights domain.13 According to FRA, 
‘the development of an OMC in the area of business and human rights allows for 
                                                   
9  Council of the EU, ‘EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy’, 
11855/12 (25 June 2012); Council of the EU, ‘Council Conclusions on the Action Plan on Human Rights and 
Democracy 2015 – 2019’, 10897/15 (20 July 2015). 
10  UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights (UNWG), ‘Guidance on National Action Plans on 
Business and Human Rights’ (December 2014), 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/UNWG_%20NAPGuidance.pdf (accessed 13 April 2017); 
revised versions of the Guidance were published in November 2015 and November 2016. 
11  Within the EU, Scotland will develop its own NAP. Of the European countries without EU membership, 
Norway published its NAP in 2015 and Switzerland in December 2016. For a global overview, see Business & 
Human Rights Resource Centre, ‘National Action Plans’, https://business-humanrights.org/en/un-guiding-
principles/implementation-tools-examples/implementation-by-governments/by-type-of-initiative/national-action-
plans (accessed 13 April 2017). 
12  See European Commission, note 7. 
13  EU Fundamental Rights Agency, ‘Improving Access to Remedy in the Area of Business and Human Rights 
at the EU Level’, FRA Opinion 1/2017 (10 April 2017). 
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potential to create among EU member states a common understanding of the problems 
and challenges in implementing the UN Guiding Principles, as well as to build 
consensus on their practical implementation.’14 
The article will explore this claim in three main steps. Section two provides an 
assessment of existing EU member state National Action Plans on business and human 
rights, as benchmarked against international NAP guidance. Section three relates the 
discussion of EU member state NAPs to the policy background and rationale of the 
Open Method of Coordination. On the one hand, the EU’s experience with open 
coordination offers valuable lessons for a successful implementation of the UNGPs on a 
global scale. On the other hand, developing an OMC on business and human rights 
within the European Union can contribute to enhancing the quality of member states’ 
National Action Plans. Against this background, section four makes some more 
concrete proposals for developing a European OMC on business and human rights – a 
possibility already considered by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency, albeit in rather 
general terms.  
 
I. IMPLEMENTING THE UNGPS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
A. International Guidance on Implementing the UNGPs via National Action Plans 
The two most important international guidelines assisting states in the development, 
implementation and review of NAPs are the Guidanc  on National Action Plans on 
Business and Human Rights developed by the UN Working Group on Business and 
Human Rights (UNWG Guidance);15 and a Toolkit on National Action Plans on Business 
and Human Rights published by the Danish Institute for Human Rights in collaboration 
with the International Corporate Accountability Roundtable (DIHR/ICAR Guidance).16 
Drawing on extensive multi-stakeholder consultations and previous experiences with 
                                                   
14  Ibid, 66–7 
15  See UNWG, note 10. 
16  Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR) and International Corporate Accountability Roundtable (ICAR), 
‘National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights: A Toolkit for the Development, Implementation, and 
Review of State Commitments to Business and Human Rights Frameworks’ (June 2014), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/583f3fca725e25fcd45aa446/t/5865d59fe6f2e17f4f0cb629/1483068841826/DI
HR-ICAR-National-Action-Plans-NAPs-Report3.pdf (accessed 13 April 2017). 
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developing NAPs, both guidelines flesh out the procedural and substantive 
requirements for an effective implementation of the UNGPs. 
National Action Plans on business and human rights should pursue three overarching 
objectives: taking stock of existing state measures that contribute to the implementation 
of the UNGPs; identifying gaps in states’ legal and policy framework that require further 
action; and outlining strategies to close protection gaps and to otherwise prevent and 
redress corporate-related human rights abuse. In this regard, the UNWG Guidance 
emphasizes four criteria essential for a NAP to be effective. First, NAPs must be based 
on the UNGPs, incorporate all three pillars and be informed by core human rights 
principles such as non-discrimination and equality. Second, NAPs must respond to 
challenges in the national context and reflect country-specific priorities or particularly 
important sectors within the national economy. Third, they must be developed and 
implemented through an inclusive and transparent process, taking the views and needs 
of affected parties and relevant (governmental and non-governmental) actors into 
account. Fourth, NAPs must be regularly reviewed to ensure continuous progress in 
enhancing human rights protection and effective responses to changing conditions in 
the regulatory environment.17  
The UNWG and DIHR/ICAR Guidance contain more detailed process- and content-
based criteria for developing and implementing a NAP. Both documents recommend 
that states make a formal commitment to engage in a NAP process, including 
publication of the terms of reference and a timeline. Stat s should furthermore establish 
a format for inter-ministerial and cross-departmental collaboration, develop and publish 
a work plan and make adequate resources available.18 Stakeholder participation in line 
with a rights-based approach is critical for a successful development of a NAP. States 
should conduct and publish a stakeholder mapping to ensure the equal inclusion of all 
affected parties. Meaningful and effective participation should be facilitated through 
capacity building and providing all stakeholders with adequate and timely information. 
Stakeholders should participate in the identification of national priority areas and 
                                                   
17  UNWG, note 10, 3–5. 
18  Ibid, 5–6; DIHR and ICAR, note 14, 41–2. 
Page 6 of 31
Cambridge University Press




implementation gaps, as well as in the development of new instruments to enhance 
human rights protection against corporate abuse.19  
In preparation of drafting a NAP, a national baseline assessment should be 
conducted by a competent independent body (external research institutes, NHRIs, etc.) 
that maps out the current state of implementation of the UNGPs. The draft NAP should 
be widely disseminated and discussed with all relevant stakeholders prior to being 
finalized and officially launched.20 A NAP should contain a ‘smart mix’ of mandatory and 
voluntary, and national and international measures,21 and ‘extend to all matters in the 
state’s jurisdiction, including matters outside the state’s territorial jurisdiction’.22 NAPs 
should outline actions to implement the UNGPs that are specific, measurable, 
achievable, relevant and time-specific (SMART).23 They should also lay down a 
framework for monitoring and reporting, based on a clear allocation of responsibility and 
accountability for implementation. All relevant ministries and government departments 
should collaborate in the implementation process, supported by a multi-stakeholder 
group and other institutions including NHRIs.24 Finally, NAPs should be regularly 
reviewed, evaluated and updated in order to identify successes and failures, remedy 
shortcomings, and share information and best practices within and between 
governments.25 
 
B. Overall Assessment of EU Member State NAPs 
While, as noted above, the EU member states have played a pioneering role in the early 
development of National Action Plans on business and human rights, their NAPs have 
at the same time been frequently criticized for shortcomings in process and content. A 
2014 assessment of the United Kingdom (UK), Dutch, Danish and Finnish NAPs 
conducted by ICAR and the European Coalition for Corporate Justice (ECCJ) suggests 
                                                   
19  UNWG, note 10, 7–8; DIHR and ICAR, note 14, 43–4. 
20  UNWG, note 10, 9; DIHR and ICAR, note 14, 44–5. 
21  UNWG, note 10, 13. 
22  DIHR and ICAR, note 14, 45. 
23  Ibid, 46. 
24  UNWG, note 10, 9–10; DIHR and ICAR, note 14, 47. 
25  UNWG, note 10, 10; DIHR and ICAR, note 14, 49. 
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that while states have involved various entities within and outside government in the 
drafting process, the mapping of relevant stakeholders and existing protection gaps, as 
well as the quality of consultations, leave much to be desired. In terms of content, while 
all four NAPS scrutinized by ICAR and ECCJ made an explicit commitment to the 
UNGPs, they focus heavily on past actions and soft/voluntary measures (such as 
awareness raising or training) at the expense of exploring forward-looking and 
regulatory options. Commitments to future action tend to remain vague, lacking 
sufficient information about concrete steps to be taken and the agencies responsible for 
implementation.26 
In a similar vein, the European Network of National Human Rights Institutions 
(ENNHRI) has criticized procedural and substantive shortcomings in the development of 
EU member state NAPs: 
Ongoing NAP processes in some Member States are neither participatory nor transparent, 
with stakeholders involved weakly or not at all, and civil society organizations in particular 
frequently lacking even basic information or opportunities to engage in dialogue with 
government representatives. Member States’ published NAPs to date mostly describe 
historical actions, and lack specific commitments capable of demonstrably improving UNGPs 
implementation at national level.27 
Noting that ‘such weaknesses undermine NAP’s contribution to respect for human 
rights, good governance and accountability both in the EU and abroad’, ENNHRI has 
called upon the European Commission to better guide member states through the NAP 
process and to establish a ‘human rights-based, participatory, transparent multi-
stakeholder NAP review process at EU level’.28 These critical assessments have been 
largely confirmed by later studies that draw on a broader sample of EU member state 
                                                   
26  ICAR and European Coalition for Corporate Justice (ECCJ), ‘Assessments of Existing National Action 
Plans (NAPs) on Business and Human Rights’ (November 2015), 3–5, 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/583f3fca725e25fcd45aa446/t/58d2bdb63a0411eedc66af79/1490206143625/IC
AR-ECCJ-Assessments-of-Existing-NAPs-2015-Update.pdf (accessed 13 April 2017). 
27  European Network of National Human Rights Institutions (ENNHRI), ‘Recommendations for the next EU 
Strategy on CSR’ (April 2015), 2, https://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/EU%20CSR%20Communication%20ENNHRI%20Final%20Apr%20
2015%20(2).pdf (accessed 13 April 2017). 
28  Ibid, 2–3. In a similar vein, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has called upon states to 
‘share plans on the national implementation of the [UNGPs], including revised National Action Plans and best 
practice concerning [their] development … ’; see Council of Europe, ‘Recommendation on human rights and 
business’, CM/Rec(2016)3 (2 March 2016), para 4. 
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NAPs.29 Based on the authors’ own analysis of existing EU member state NAPs, three 
main procedural and substantive shortcomings risk undermining an effective 
implementation of the UNGPs in the European Union: a failure to use indicators and 
benchmarks to measure success; inadequate provision for monitoring, review and 
follow-up; and a misalignment of the three pillars, leading to a failure to adopt a smart 
regulatory mix of voluntary and mandatory instruments. 
 
C. Insufficient Use of Indicators and Benchmarks  
For states to design SMART actions implementing the UNGPs, the effects of the 
employed instruments have to be ‘measurable’.30 Classical tools of measuring 
effectiveness of public policies are indicators and benchmarks.31 Indicators are 
parameters that assess whether and to what extent (the laws and policies envisaged in) 
the NAPs have proven suitable to contribute to an effective implementation of the 
UNGPs; benchmarks are quantifiable targets that states set themselves to achieve. 
Possible indicators and benchmarks that could be used are various, ranging from the 
number of corporations of a certain size having adopted a human rights due diligence 
mechanism (as defined in the second pillar of the UNGPs) to the amount of (public and 
private) funding being dedicated to the implementation process. 
The current NAPs often fail to specify quantitative or qualitative indicators, and rarely 
set concrete benchmarks to be achieved. One exception is found in the German NAP 
that sets a benchmark of 50 per cent of German companies with more than 500 
                                                   
29  European Parliament, ‘Study: Implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights’ (2017), 39–42, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/578031/EXPO_STU(2017)578031_EN.pdf (accessed 
13 April 2017). 
30  According to the ICAR/ECCJ Guidance, SMART actions are those that are ‘specific, measurable, 
achievable, relevant and time-specific’. ICAR and ECCJ, note 26, 46. 
31  The UNWG recommends that in developing NAPs, ‘Governments should adopt an evidence-based 
approach, gathering data and assessing what may be required to align existing laws, regulation and policies with the 
Guiding Principles’. In particular, governments should consider ‘attaching clear objectives, time frames and 
indicators to guide the implementation of the various measures.’ UN General Assembly, ‘Human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises: Note by the Secretary-General’, A/69/263 (5 August 
2014), paras 20, 73. 
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employees to have incorporated human rights due diligence by 2020.32 If the 50 per 
cent target is missed, the German government will consider (‘prüfen’) further 
(legislative) steps.33 The Dutch, Danish and Italian NAPs include a list of forward-
looking ‘action points’ aligned with the UNGPs, yet without sufficiently circumscribed 
indicators, benchmarks or a clearly defined time-frame.34  
The Dutch NAP at least contains a ‘transparency benchmark’ with which the 
government aims to encourage corporate human rights reporting.35 Other EU member 
state NAPs offer suitable entry points that could be developed into indicators and 
benchmarks in the future. The Swedish NAP, for instance, encourages companies to 
create grievance and redress mechanisms (e.g., ombudsmen mechanisms), but falls 
short of setting a concrete benchmark.36 The Lithuanian NAP promises to offer awards 
for responsible businesses and best anti-corruption practices, without, however, 
quantifying or measuring these efforts.37 The Finnish NAP considers that new funding 
                                                   
32  German Government, ‘Nationaler Aktionsplan: Umsetzung der VN-Leitprinzipien für Wirtschaft und 
Menschenrechte 2016-2020‘ (21 December 2016), 12, http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/754690/publicationFile/222786/161221-NAP-DL.pdf (accessed 13 April 2017). 
33  Ibid. While observers have welcomed this target, critique has been voiced concerning the unassertive 
nature of the government’s response should the target be missed, rendering the benchmark a toothless tiger; see 
Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte, ‘Stellungnahme: “Zögerliche Umsetzung”: Der politische Wille reicht nicht 
weiter: Deutschland setzt die VN-Leitprinzipien um – mit kleinen Schritten’ (21 December 2016), 
http://www.institut-fuer-
menschenrechte.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Publikationen/Stellungnahmen/Stellungnahme_Verabschiedung_NAP_W
irtschaft_und_Menschenrechte.pdf (accessed 13 April 2017) . 
34  Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights’ (April 2014), 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/publicaties/2014/01/30/national-action-plan-on-business-and-human-
rights (accessed 13 April 2017); Danish Government, ‘Danish National Action Plan: Implementation of the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (March 2014), 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/NationalPlans/Denmark_NationalPlanBHR.pdf (accessed 
13 April 2017); Italian Government, ‘Italian National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights 2016-2021’ 
(1 December 2016), http://www.cidu.esteri.it/resource/2016/07/48254_f_NAPBHRENGOpenConsultation.pdf 
(accessed 13 April 2017). 
35 ‘The Netherlands pursues an active policy of encouraging social reporting through the transparency 
benchmark. This benchmark is carried out every year on the instructions of the Ministry of Economic Affairs to give 
the 500 largest Dutch companies a rating for transparency on sustainability and CSR.’ Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, note 34, 29. 
36  Government Offices of Sweden, ‘Action Plan for Business and Human Rights’ (August 2015), 17, 
http://www.government.se/4a84f5/contentassets/822dc47952124734b60daf1865e39343/action-plan-for-business-
and-human-rights.pdf (accessed 13 April 2017). 
37  Government of the Republic of Lithuania, ‘Lithuania’s Action Plan on the Implementation of the United 
Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (March 2015), 7, 
https://www.urm.lt/uploads/default/documents/uzienio_politika/zmogaus_teises/zmogaus_teises_EN/14_EN.pdf 
(accessed 13 April 2017). 
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lines to support the UNGPs could ‘possibly’ be made available but fails to indicate any 
concrete time commitment or target as to the intended amount.38 A commitment to hold 
roundtable meetings with all relevant stakeholders on a sector-by-sector basis remains 
similarly vague.39 The German NAP lists a number of measures suitable for the use of 
indicators and benchmarks, including corporations’ establishment of internal and 
external complaint procedures, or the introduction of a seal of approval 
(‘Gewährleistungsmarke’) for commodities whose production process explicitly adheres 
to human rights standards.40  
Recent studies on the suitability of indicators and benchmarks in assessing business-
related human rights impacts provide a solid basis for including such indicators and 
benchmarks into the NAPs.41 This would render the envisaged actions more 
measurable and the implementing institutions more accountable for goals they have set-
out. While some EU member states have already conducted comparative studies in 
areas of law and policy relevant to business and human rights,42 a set of agreed 
indicators and benchmarks would also facilitate cross-country comparison and could 
contribute to enhancing policy coherence at the European level (as supported in the 
recent FRA opinion).43 
 
D. Inadequate provision for monitoring, review and follow-up 
The provisions in EU member state NAPs concerning monitoring and follow-up are 
similarly weak or incomplete. Commonly, the lack of concrete commitments goes hand 
                                                   
38  Finnish Ministry of Employment and the Economy, ‘National Action Plan for the Implementation of the 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (October 2014), 29, 
https://tem.fi/documents/1410877/3437254/National+Action+Plan+for+the+implementation+of+the+UN+guiding+
principles+21102014.pdf (accessed 13 April 2017). 
39  See ibid, 26. 
40  See German Government, note 32, 9–11, 30. 
41  Dylan Tromp, ‘Assessing Business Related Impacts on Human Rights: Indicators and Benchmark in 
Standards and Practice’, INEF-Report 110/2016 (December 2016), https://inef.uni-due.de/cms/files/report110.pdf 
(accessed 13 April 2017). 
42 The Dutch government has recently published a comparative study on duties of care of Dutch business 
enterprises with respect to international CSR; see Liesbeth Enneking et al, ‘Zorgplichten van Nederlands 
ondernemingen insake internationaal maatschappelijk verantwoord ondernemen’ (December 2015), 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2016/04/21/zorgplichten-van-nederlandse-ondernemingen-
inzake-internationaal-maatschappelijk-verantwoord-ondernemen (accessed 13 April 2017). 
43  See EU Fundamental Rights Agency, note 13, 65. 
Page 11 of 31
Cambridge University Press




in hand with a failure to specify the institution responsible and accountable for 
monitoring and updating the NAP. With regard to monitoring, the Finnish NAP provides 
for yearly monitoring by the Finnish Committee on Corporate Social Responsibility.44 
The Danish NAP promises, albeit vaguely, to ‘continuously update Danish priorities with 
regard to the implementation of the UNGPs’ in alignment with its National Action Plan 
on CSR’45 The German NAP announces a yearly evaluation of the implementation 
process and assigns this task to a new specific inter-ministerial institution, supported by 
the (already existing and slightly enlarged) German CSR-forum.46 However, monitoring 
is made conditional upon budgetary permission.47 Moreover, NGOs have expressed 
concerns about the composition of the enlarged CSR forum, fearing an 
overrepresentation of business interests and an undue focus on voluntary as opposed 
to mandatory measures.48 The Italian NAP that runs from 2016 to 2021 shall be 
‘periodically monitored through an ongoing process of analysis of its implementation 
and consultation with all social partners and relevant stakeholders’.49 The NAP 
designates the Inter-ministerial Committee for Human Rights at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and International Cooperation as the responsible entity for monitoring the 
implementation of the NAP. A ‘mid-term review’ is envisaged for 2018.50 
In the Netherlands, a NAP update is on its way. The Netherlands Institute for Human 
Rights has urged the Dutch Government to provide more specific information about the 
follow-up measures it intends to take: 
The Institute notes that the action plan contains no concrete information about the follow-up. 
It is not indicated in the plan when the plan will start, which period it exactly covers and when 
there will be feedback about the various measures taken. It is also not indicated when the 
                                                   
44  See Finnish Ministry of Employment and the Economy, note 38, 32. 
45  See Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, note 34, 22. 
46  See German Government, note 32, 33, 40–1 (‘interministerieller Ausschuss’). 
47  Ibid, 40. 
48  Corporate Accountability (CorA), Forum Menschenrechte and Verband Entwicklungspolitik und 
Humanitäre Hilfe (VENRO), ‘No Courage to Commit: Comments of German non-governmental organisations on 
the German government’s National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights’ (6 February 2017), 14–15. 
49  See Italian Government, note 34, 29. 
50  Ibid. 
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various measures will be completed and when an update version of the action plan may be 
expected.51 
The Swedish NAP indicates that there could be a review in 2017 without using 
mandatory language or circumscribing the scope of such a review.52 While neither the 
German nor the Italian NAP explicitly commit to an update,53 both NAPs are time-limited 
so that an update can be expected by 2020 (Germany) and 2021 (Italy) at the latest. 
The United Kingdom is currently the only country to have published an updated 
version of its NAP, honouring a commitment made in its 2013 National Action Plan. The 
update serves mainly to record government achievements since the publication of the 
initial NAP in 2013 and to reflect more recent international developments, including 
guidance on implementation and the experience of other countries.54 While the UK 
update itself does not add much to the original NAP in terms of forward-looking actions, 
the UK Joint Committee on Human Rights has launched an (ongoing) inquiry into 
human rights and business that scrutinizes the steps the government takes to monitor 
compliance with the UNGPs; to clarify how far the government is able to enforce the 
UNGPs; to review progress British business has made in carrying out its responsibility 
to respect human rights; and to verify whether victims of human rights abuse involving 
business enterprises within UK jurisdiction have access to effective remedies.55 Notably, 
while the 2016 version of the NAP reaffirms the government’s previous commitment to 
report each year on implementation progress, it does not contain any information or 
commitment on a future NAP update.56 Nevertheless, the UK example points to the 
importance of regularly reviewing and updating NAPs, under the scrutiny of 
                                                   
51  Netherlands Institute for Human Rights, ‘Advice: Response to the National Action Plan on Business and 
Human Rights “Knowing and Showing”’ (February 2014), 13, https://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/netherlands-nhri-re-national-action-plan.pdf (accessed 13 April 2017). 
52  See Government Offices of Sweden, note 36, 19. 
53  The German NAP merely envisages a ‘status report’ in preparation of a future review of the NAP. German 
Government, note 32, 41. 
54  UK Government, ‘Good Business: Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights, Updated May 2016’ (May 2016), 2, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/522805/Good_Business_Implementin
g_the_UN_Guiding_Principles_on_Business_and_Human_Rights_updated_May_2016.pdf (accessed 13 April 
2017). 
55  See UK Parliament, ‘Human Rights and Business Inquiry’, 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/human-rights-
committee/inquiries/parliament-2015/inquiry/ (accessed 13 April 2017). 
56  See UK Government, note 54, 24. 
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parliamentary bodies sufficiently independent from government.57 A regular review and 
update process is indispensable to adapt NAPs to a changing international regulatory 
and economic environment. Identifying responsible institutions and setting binding 
timeframes for review contributes to holding states to account for failures to deliver on 
their commitments. 
 
E. Insufficient alignment of the pillars, coupled with a failure to adopt a smart 
regulatory mix 
An effective implementation of the UNGPs requires that the three pillars of the ‘protect, 
respect and remedy’ framework are treated as a complementary whole, with each pillar 
supporting the others in achieving sustainable progress. Yet existing EU Member NAPs 
cover the three pillars unevenly, with little attention given in particular to remediation 
(pillar three).58 Moreover, many NAPs focus on pillar two at the expense of exploring the 
full scope of the state duty to protect against corporate human rights abuse. One 
consequence is that, as in the case of the Danish NAP, measures relating to pillar two 
appear reminiscent of the old ‘voluntary’ approach to CSR in that they heavily rely on 
corporate self-regulation and access to non-judicial remedies.59 Relatedly, the NAPs fail 
to make sufficient use of mandatory instruments, with state actions listed under pillar 
one mainly confined to ‘soft’ measures such as state guidance, awareness raising, and 
training initiatives.60 While important, such measures are not suitable to address well-
documented protection gaps in the legal framework governing business and human 
rights, particularly in the area of access to justice and effective remedies.61  
The insufficient alignment of the three pillars translates into a failure of the NAPs to 
adopt a ‘smart mix’ of voluntary and mandatory instruments that would allow states to 
                                                   
57  See UNWG, note 10, 9–10. 
58  See ICAR and ECCJ, note 26, 4. 
59  See Danish Government, note 34, 17–18. 
60  See ICAR and ECCJ, note 26, 4. 
61  See Human Rights Council, ‘Improving accountability and access to remedy for victims of business-related 
human rights abuse’, A/HRC/32/19 (10 May 2016), para 5. See further Gwynne Skinner, Robert McCorquodale and 
Olivier De Schutter, ‘The Third Pillar: Access to Judicial Remedies for Human Rights Violations by Transnational 
Business (December 2013), https://icar.squarespace.com/s/The-Third-Pillar-FINAL1.pdf (accessed 13 April 2017); 
EU Fundamental Rights Agency, note 13. 
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use their political and financial leverage in incentivising or compelling corporations to 
respect human rights. The NAPs’ approach to human rights due diligence – the heart of 
pillar two – is a good example. Human rights due diligence is not only relevant in 
relation to the corporate responsibility to respect in that it enables businesses to 
manage stakeholder-related risk. Incentivising or requiring human rights due diligence is 
equally a means for states to comply with their duty to protect human rights.62 The EU 
member state NAPs fail to sufficiently operationalize this mutually reinforcing 
relationship between pillars one and two. The Dutch government, for example, commits 
to taking a more proactive role in implementing the UNGPs and to analysing its current 
regulatory mix as applied to human rights due diligence. However, the Dutch NAP 
largely confines itself to listing supportive government actions (such as awareness 
raising and capacity building) and does not provide for legislative and enforcement 
measures. As concerns the latter, the NAP concludes that consultations have ‘failed to 
produce consensus on whether the obligations of Dutch companies in relation to CSR 
are adequately regulated by law’.63 The prevalence of voluntary instruments and an 
uneven implementation of regulatory measures across the European Union are not only 
detrimental to an effective global implementation of the UNGPs but also risk 
undermining a coherent European approach to business and human rights.64 
The preparation of the German NAP, previously expected to set a very ambitious 
standard,65 offers an example of how achieving a smart regulatory mix through a proper 
alignment of the three pillars can be jeopardized during the drafting process. A 2013 
scoping study for the German Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs had highlighted the 
importance of the state duty to protect in ensuring and monitoring corporate human 
                                                   
62  John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Regulating Multinationals: The UN Guiding Principles, Civil Society, and 
International Legalization’, Harvard Kennedy School, Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government, 
Regulatory Policy Program Working Paper RPP-2015-04 (2015), 4, 
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/content/download/74031/1678736/version/1/file/RPP_2015_04_Ruggie.pdf (accessed 
13 April 2017). 
63  See Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, note 34, 28, 41. Considering access to justice, the Netherlands 
Institute for Human Rights has urged the Dutch government ‘to remove the procedural inequality between victims of 
human rights violations and companies who violate human rights.’ Netherlands Institute for Human Rights, note 51, 
2. 
64  Maddalena Neglia, ‘The UNGPs – Five Years On: From Consensus to Divergence in Public Regulation on 
Business and Human Rights’ (2016) 34:4 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 289. 
65  See Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte, note 33, 10. 
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rights due diligence.66 The later multi-stakeholder consultations in preparation of the 
NAP were conducted under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and received 
considerable praise.67 The results of the consultations, however, did not properly 
translate into the final NAP.68 In July 2016, the Ministry of Finance – not previously 
involved in the process – requested significant last-minute revisions of the draft NAP, 
allegedly under pressure from corporate lobbying.69 These revisions would have omitted 
any reference to legislative instruments requiring human rights due diligence. Proposals 
to elaborate corporate due diligence obligations through best-practice examples and 
guidelines were branded as ‘sweeping’ and ‘arbitrary’. The entire chapter on monitoring 
would have been removed. The final NAP published in December 2016 is an awkward 
compromise that, while in some ways paving new ground, is in many parts 
noncommittal and dominated by concerns of creating a ‘global level playing field’ for 
German corporations.70 
 
II. IMPROVING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNGPS VIA NAPS:  
LESSONS FROM THE OMC 
A. The Concept of the Open Method of Coordination 
The existing experience with NAP development in the EU member states displays 
significant shortcomings. To what extent – in line with its business and human rights 
strategy – could the EU play a role in addressing some of these failings? One can build 
a more complete picture of the strengths and limitations of the existing NAP process by 
                                                   
66  Jutta Knopf et al, ‘Unternehmensverantwortung für Menschenrechte: Ableitung von 
Handlungsempfehlungen auf der Basis von Experteninterviews und internationalen Fallstudien’ (Februar 2013), 
https://www.adelphi.de/de/publikation/unternehmensverantwortung-f%C3%BCr-menschenrechte (accessed 13 April 
2017). 
67  See European Parliament, note 29, 41. 
68  Several NGOs have expressed concerns that while having been involved in the early development of the 
NAP, they were largely excluded from the drafting process over the last months prior to its release; see CorA, 
Forum Menschenrechte and VENRO, note 48, 4; ‘Aktionsplan für Menschenrechte: “Ein Weckruf auch für die 
deutsche Wirtschaft”, Deutschlandfunk (21 December 2016), http://www.deutschlandfunk.de/aktionsplan-fuer-
menschenrechte-ein-weckruf-auch-fuer-die.694.de.html?dram:article_id=374462 (accessed 13 April 2017). 
69  See Christin Gottler and Andreas Maus, ‘Lobbyismus auf Regierungsebene: Profit statt Menschenrechte’, 
Monitor (8 September 2016), http://www1.wdr.de/daserste/monitor/sendungen/lobbyismus-104.html (accessed 13 
April 2017). 
70  See German Government, note 32. The German Institute for Human Rights described the final NAP as 
evincing ‘a lack of political will to advance the UNGPs.’ Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte, note 33. 
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engaging with the history of other forms of trans-national policy coordination. A prime 
example in this regard is the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) – a process for multi-
lateral surveillance introduced to coordinate EU social policies in the late 90’s.71 Since 
that period, the method has spread to a number of further policy areas, from education 
to culture, health, fiscal policy and beyond. While one of the characteristic features of 
the OMC is the lack of any one single procedural model applicable to all fields, the core 
of the method was elaborated by the Lisbon European Council in 2000. Most OMC 
processes thus contain some elements of the following four features (some of which 
mirror the design of the UNGP NAP process): 
• Fixing guidelines for the Union combined with specific timetables for achieving the goals 
which they set in the short, medium and long terms; 
• Establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks 
against the best in the world and tailored to the needs of different Member States and 
sectors as a means of comparing best practice; 
• Translating these European guidelines into national and regional policies by setting specific 
targets and adopting measures, taking into account national and regional differences; 
• Periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organised as mutual learning processes.72 
Understanding the usefulness of the Open Method of Coordination for implementing 
the UNGPs via National Action Plans requires understanding the rationale for the 
OMC’s creation. At its core is a tension between diversity and interdependence. For the 
EU of the late 1990s and early 2000s, interdependence meant the increasing realization 
that in a common currency Union, fiscal and social policies were likely to have severe 
spill-over effects between states (potentially capable of de-stabilising the Union itself). 
Accompanying this was the realization that in an integrated economic area, joined 
action was needed to avoid a ‘race to the bottom’ in elaborating social standards.73 
Attempts of individual member states to enhance social protection could negatively 
affect their national economic competitiveness in a common (internal) European market 
                                                   
71  On the history of the OMC, see Mark Dawson, New Governance and the Transformation of European Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 24–68. On its more recent evolution, see Egidijus Barcevičius, J. 
Timo Weishaupt and Jonathan Zeitlin, ‘Tracing the Social OMC from its Origins to Europe 2020’, in Egidijus 
Barcevičius, J. Timo Weishaupt and Jonathan Zeitlin (eds.), Assessing the Open Method of Coordination: 
Institutional Design and National Influence of EU Social Policy Coordination (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014) 16. 
72  European Council, ‘Lisbon European Council 23 and 24 March 2000: Presidency Conclusions’ (2000), 
para 37, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm (accessed 13 April 2017). 
73 See See Fritz W. Scharpf, ‘The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity’ (2002) 40 
Journal of Common Market Studies 4. 
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as such attempts may incentivise companies to relocate to member states with lower 
protection standards. In this sense, social policy became an area of ‘common’ European 
concern in which solutions to social and economic problems had to be sought 
collectively.  
The diversity concern was that extensive EU intervention in areas such as budgetary 
and social policy was legally, politically and functionally infeasible.74 Legally, the EU 
carried unclear competences in these domains under the European Treaties.75 
Politically, member states were unwilling to transfer more control to an unloved Brussels 
machinery. Meanwhile, functionally, any attempt at harmonising national rules would 
likely flounder given the obvious diversity between the social and fiscal regimes of the 
member states. Open Coordination was the perfect solution to this dilemma.76 It 
promised coordinated EU action, guided by common principles and goals, but EU action 
that respected ‘legitimate diversity’ between different national legal and social orders.77 
It also promised a more responsive form of EU regulation, where member states could 
shift and change their policy priorities according to new developments, and experiment 
with and learn from the practices of their neighbours.78 The outcome – a process of 
national plans based on EU goals, with peer-level review, exchange and benchmarking 
at the EU level – was thus seen as the best of both worlds: EU action without steering 
and control from the top down.  
                                                   
74  See Fritz W. Scharpf, ‘The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity’ (2002) 40 
Journal of Common Market Studies 4. 
75  See the limits on social policy measures contained in Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, 2012 OJ C 326/47 (adopted on 13 December 2007, entered into force on 1 
December 2009), art 153. 
76  Jonathan Zeitlin, ‘Social Europe and Experimentalist Governance: Towards a New Constitutional 
Compromise?’ in Gráinne de Búrca (ed.) EU Law and the Welfare State: In Search of Solidarity (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005) 213; Gráinne de Búrca, ‘The Constitutional Challenge of New Governance in the European 
Union’ (2003) 28 European Law Review 6. 
77  Fritz W. Scharpf, ‘Legitimate Diversity: The New Challenge of European Integration’ in Tanja A. Borzel 
and Rachel A. Cichowski (eds.), The State of the European Union, Vol. 6: Law, Politics and Society (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003) 79. 
78  Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, ‘Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of 
Experimentalist Governance in the European Union’, in Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin (eds.), 
Experimentalist Governance in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 1; Olivier De Schutter 
and Simon Deakin, ‘Reflexive Governance and the Dilemmas of Social Regulation’ in Olivier De Schutter and 
Simon Deakin (eds.), Social Rights and Market Forces: Is the Open Coordination of Employment and Social 
Policies the Future of Social Europe? (Brussels: Brulyant, 2005) 3. 
Page 18 of 31
Cambridge University Press




B. Lessons from the OMC for the UNGP NAP Process 
The European Union context in which the OMC has been developed differs significantly 
from the broader global context in which the UNGPs need to be implemented via 
National Action Plans. To take some of the key differences, the EU is a highly integrated 
legal space made up of a group of comparatively homogenous ‘Western’ liberal nation-
states. At the same time, the challenges faced by many non-European states in 
implementing the UNGPs – most pertinently the fact that oftentimes the most severe 
human rights violations are committed by Europe-based ‘multi-national’ corporations 
operating in so-called developing countries – will be more difficult to address than the 
social policy challenges managed via the OMC. These differences notwithstanding, the 
European experience with open coordination can be helpful in improving the global 
process of implementing the UNGPs via National Action Plans. 
The UNGPs’ attempt to ‘close governance gaps created by globalisation’ responds to 
the necessity of enhanced state cooperation in preventing and redressing corporate 
human rights abuse under conditions of global interdependency.79 The ability of states 
to enforce human rights in relation to businesses incorporated within their jurisdiction 
increasingly depends on the human rights practise of other states where those 
businesses may be producing, packaging and trading their goods. Responding to this 
challenge requires consistent and effective international standards that ensure 
corporate compliance with human rights wherever they operate. At the same time, the 
legal and political orders into which the UNGPs must fit, and the state capacity to 
enforce them, varies considerably between national contexts. As a result, agreement on 
binding international norms – such as an overarching Treaty regime – has thus far 
proven difficult to achieve.80 As the UNWG Guidance puts it, ‘while all NAPs share 
                                                   
79  Human Rights Council, ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights’, 
A/HRC/8/5 (7 April 2008) para 3. 
80  An early failed attempt in this regard were the 2003 UN Draft Norms that proposed to directly impose 
international human rights obligations on corporations; see UN Economic and Social Council, ‘Draft Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12 (26 August 2003). In 2014, the Human Rights Council adopted a resolution establishing a 
working group tasked with drafting an international human rights and business treaty; Human Rights Council, 
‘Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises with respect to human rights’, A/HRC/RES/26/9 (14 July 2014). 
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common ground in their alignment with the UNGPs and with international human rights 
instruments, M NAPs and the processes through which they are developed and 
updated must also adjust to each state’s capacity, and cultural and historic contexts’.81 
Moreover, the UNGP process speaks to the OMC’s challenge of managing collective 
action problems to avoid a ‘race to the bottom’ in regulatory and human rights 
standards. Economic globalization places both developed and developing states in a 
bind.82 The experience with existing EU member state NAPs suggests that there are 
currently few incentives for home states of multi-national corporations to create binding 
extraterritorial standards lest those companies decide to shift capital and jobs 
elsewhere. Host states’ attempt to enhance human rights protection in relation to 
corporations operating on their territories, by contrast, carries the risk to imperil foreign 
trade and investment. This enables in particular large corporate groups to free-ride on 
inter-state competition – a global collective action problem that the UNGPs seek to 
address by encouraging states to move forward together without unilateral economic 
self-harm or competitive downward pressure on human rights standards. 
It is for reason of these comparable governance challenges that the OMC’s 
experience can provide a number of lessons for successfully managing the tension 
between interdependency and diversity through the NAP process. Rather 
unsurprisingly, given the high hopes that greeted its arrival, the OMC in practice rarely 
lived up to its full promise. A key concern within social science research has been the 
OMC’s effectiveness.83 The EU’s original Lisbon Strategy failed to reach most of its 
headline targets, with much of the blame falling at the OMC’s door.84 One problem was 
the OMC’s voluntary nature: if member states were to deliver social and economic goals 
                                                   
81  See UNWG, note 10, 4. 
82 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this observation. 
83  See, e.g., Martina Eckhardt, ‘The Open Method of Coordination on Pensions: an Economic Analysis of its 
Effects on Pension Reforms’ (2005) 15 Journal of European Social Policy 247; Martin Lodge, ‘Comparing Non-
Hierarchical Governance in Action: The Open Method of Coordination in Pensions and Information Society’ (2007) 
45 Journal of Common Market Studies 2; Milena Buchs, New Governance in European Social Policy: The Open 
Method of Coordination (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan: 2007). 
84 See Wim Kok, Chair of the High Level Group, ‘Facing the Challenge: The Lisbon Strategy for Growth and 
Employment’ (2004), https://ec.europa.eu/research/evaluations/pdf/archive/fp6-evidence-
base/evaluation_studies_and_reports/evaluation_studies_and_reports_2004/the_lisbon_strategy_for_growth_and_e
mployment__report_from_the_high_level_group.pdf (accessed 13 April 2017). 
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through purely national plans, what was their incentive to be responsive to common EU 
objectives?85 It was feared that national reports would merely list programs 
governments wished to implement anyway. States would follow EU principles they 
agreed with and disregard those that involved budgetary and political costs. Such a risk 
also presents itself in relation to the UNGP NAPs – and has already shown signs of 
realisation in those EU member state NAPs that confine themselves to listing past 
national achievements.86 UNGP NAPs, too, are designed as a largely nationally guided 
process with few explicit incentives (either positive or negative) for governments to 
respond directly to international norms. 
However, the OMC’s evolution from these early experiences also illustrates how both 
positive and negative incentives can be established. While empirical accounts of the 
first ten years of the OMC’s life are relatively sceptical about its ability to induce direct 
policy change, these accounts are more supportive of ‘second order’ effects.87 Second-
order effects concern the ability of the OMC to alter the process through which national 
and EU policy-making is conducted, encouraging policy-making to be more responsive 
to over-arching substantive goals.  
One example is the ability of the OMC to mainstream social goals across government 
departments and to place social topics on the national agenda.88 This represents a 
concern of European policy-makers to this day (and one that finds some mirror in other 
‘horizontal’ EU policy fields, including human rights). The fate of social policy, and its 
ability to meet positive social targets and outcomes, is likely to depend on policies 
determined beyond the traditional confines of social and labour ministries. For instance, 
a key determinant of social policy can be the attitudes of finance ministries, in terms of 
their willingness either to devote resources to social programmes or to consider the 
impact of financial and tax measures on inequality. By requiring the government as a 
                                                   
85  The UNWG has highlighted a similar problem with regard to the UNGP NAP process: ‘The experience of 
ongoing processes points to the challenges in marrying together dedicated leadership and ownership of national 
action plans through cross-Government cooperation.’ UN General Assembly, note 31, para 13.  
86  See ICAR and ECCJ, note 26. 
87  On the OMC’s national effects, see Dawson, note 71, 164–234; Martin Heidenreich and Jonathan Zeitlin, 
Changing European Employment and Welfare Regimes: The Influence of the OMC on National Reforms (London: 
Routledge, 2009). 
88 Heidenreich and Zeitlin, ibid, at 221 
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whole to produce a common national employment or social inclusion strategy across 
departments, one goal of the social OMC has been to encourage states to develop 
cross-departmental governance structures in which social concerns are placed on the 
agenda of national actors who may otherwise be institutionally oblivious to such goals.  
Another such ‘second order’ effect can consist of improving policy-makers’ 
understanding of the relationship between policies and effects. Designing effective 
social policies requires understanding the likely impacts of those policies on different 
groups in society, and the way similar policies have developed in the past. By asking 
states to measure their social performance, and by developing data streams and 
statistical indicators (e.g. on inequality or poverty at EU level, the OMC’s rationale is 
also couched in terms of improving states’ capacity for evidence-based policy-making.89 
At the same time, the developed indicators and metrics can be used by civil society 
groups to monitor the social performance of individual states and of the EU as a whole. 
These examples of ‘second-order effects’ speak to some elements of the UNWG and 
ICAR-ECCJ NAP Guidance already taken up by a number of EU member states, such 
as the emphasis placed on inter-ministerial and cross-departmental cooperation and the 
importance of including civil society actors into the development and implementation of 
NAPs.  
 
C. Structural Features of the OMC Process 
The ability to induce ‘second-order effects’ depends on a number of structural features 
of the OMC process – features that the UNGP NAP process does not yet possess. 
These include, first, an infrastructure for states to conduct peer review on the 
performance of other states. In the OMC case, this is normally done within specialized 
committees, made up of national representatives and EU officials, who assess national 
plans according to common EU objectives and indicators. Peer review can be seen in 
terms of both negative and positive inducement. Negatively, peer review allows states 
to critically assess the performance of their neighbours, particularly in circumstances 
                                                   
89 See e.g. the importance of evidence based tools in the 2008 re-launch of the Social Protection and Inclusion 
OMC. Commission Communication, ‘A Renewed Commitment to Social Europe: Re-enforcing the Open Method of 
Coordination for Social Protectiona and Social Inclusion’, COM (2008) 418 final. 
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where negative national performance can have externalities on other states.90 Here, 
peer review provides a reason (in the absence of ‘hard’ legal obligations) for national 
officials to take seriously both the quality of their NAPs and the outcomes that domestic 
reforms produce over time. Yet peer review is about more than ‘negative’ shaming: 
empirical evidence from the OMC in the social policy field suggests that peer review 
mainly focuses on positive performers.91 How have neighbouring states managed to 
successfully tackle endemic problems such as child poverty or long-term unemployment 
and how can their regulatory approach inform reform efforts elsewhere? Here, peer 
review exploits the positive aspects of interdependence: that other states are likely to 
face similar problems and may have innovative solutions to be learned from.92 
Secondly, part of the OMC’s success (as discussed above) has been associated with 
developing indicators, and improving the information basis through which national 
policy-makers form their decisions. In the field of social policy, for example, the EU’s 
Social Protection Committee has developed a Social Protection Performance Monitor 
(SPPM), whose function is to track the performance of EU member states according to 
different metrics of social performance (e.g., employment, health and material 
deprivation).93 Crucially, the function of indicator development is not only cross-national 
comparison but to allow states to better understand causal relationships between 
different forms of regulation and social outcomes. What, for example, is the impact of 
early school-leaving on employment and productivity, or the effect of fiscal transfers to 
certain vulnerable groups on the poverty rate? The goal in this sense is not a 
convergence of social policies across states but a better understanding of the capacities 
and limitations of various policy tools to achieve a given goal. As highlighted in section 
                                                   
90  This is a key rationale behind the coordination of national budgets in the European semester – significant 
economic imbalances could de-stabilize the Eurozone, putting pressure on the financial stability of others; see the 
explanations in European Commission, ‘European Semester: A New Architecture for the New EU Economic 
Governance – Q&A’, MEMO/11/14 (12 January 2011). 
91  Jelle Visser, ‘The OMC as Selective Amplifier for National Strategies for Reform’ in Jonathan Zeitlin and 
Philippe Pochet (eds.), The Open Method of Coordination in Action: The European Employment and Social 
Inclusion Strategies (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2005) 173; Sandra Kroger, Soft Governance in Hard Politics: European 
Coordination of Anti-Poverty Policies in France and Germany (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2008) 44–6. 
92  On learning under the OMC, see Claudio M. Radaelli, ‘Europeanization, Policy Learning and New Modes 
of Governance’ (2008) 10 Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice 3. 
93  European Commission, Social Protection Committee, ‘Social Protection Performance Monitor (SPPM) – 
Methodological Report by the Indicators Sub-group of the Social Protection Committee’ (17 October 2012), 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=9235& (accessed 13 April 2017). 
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three, the issue of indicators and benchmarks is one for which both the NAP guidance 
and NAP development in the EU member states has thus far shown little interest. 
Thirdly, one should reflect on the OMC’s failures as well as its successes. A 
frequently lamented feature of open coordination has been its poor record in terms of 
participation and transparency.94 This record has had a bearing not only on the OMC’s 
wider legitimacy but also on its effectiveness. The failure, for example, to include 
parliaments and regional bodies in the process of establishing national plans under the 
OMC gave rise to complaints that open coordination suffers from a lack of national and 
regional ownership, with ambitious goals set at the EU-level often forgotten or 
disappointed when ‘translated’ into national action.95 This is particularly so in certain 
types of constitutional order: in federal states (e.g., Germany, where lower-levels of 
governance have strong regulatory powers) or states with strong forms of parliamentary 
control (e.g., in Scandinavia), government plans without wider institutional input risk 
being overturned by other bodies later in the policy-making process. The link between 
poor participatory performance and weak delivery is yet another lesson the OMC may 
provide for the UNGP NAP process 
Providing an appropriate institutional and procedural infrastructure for the OMC has 
been key to open coordination’s successes and limitations. A policy coordination 
process that relies purely on national reporting, without any inducements to deliver on 
commitments made or improve performance over time, can easily slip into a box-ticking 
exercise that is increasingly unresponsive to its initial goals. Similarly, a national 
strategy without wide domestic buy-in, including from constitutionally significant bodies, 
cannot expect to deliver wide-ranging reforms. Finally, a process of developing complex 
national strategies in response to transnational and global challenges is simply a 
wasted opportunity if no structures exist to compare national performance, to improve 
collective understanding of evolving shared problems, and to allow states to respond to 
the practices of their neighbours. Given the many features that the NAP process and 
                                                   
94  Milena Büchs, ‘How Legitimate is the Open Method of Coordination?’ (2008) 46 Journal of Common 
Market Studies 4; Sandra Kröger, ‘The End of Democracy as we know it? The Legitimacy Deficits of Bureaucratic 
Social Policy Governance’ (2007) 29 Journal of European Integration 5. 
95 See Kok, note 82; Dawson, note 71, 199–206. 
Page 24 of 31
Cambridge University Press




the OMC share in common, the lessons learnt from the open coordination’s existing 
history are also of relevance to implementing the UNGPs at the global level. 
  
III. TOWARDS A EUROPEAN OMC FOR BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
A. An OMC for Business and Human Rights in the EU Governance Context 
The OMC’s experience points to some deficiencies of the otherwise highly detailed 
existing guidance for developing and implementing National Action Plans on business 
and human rights. The lack of sufficient consideration for indicator development, 
benchmarking, peer pressure and mutual learning through peer review suggests 
concerns about the broader sustainability and effectiveness of the NAP process. Some 
lessons, however, may have more specific relevance to the European Union and the 
connections between the NAP process and the broader structure of EU governance. 
The vast majority of currently existing NAPs stem from EU member states. This creates 
a unique opportunity for developing national measures in a coordinated manner within 
the European Union. One noticeable aspect of many of the NAPs produced by EU 
member states is their frequent references, either to EU-wide strategies on CSR, or to 
EU legislative measures.96 Moreover, the competence to implement a comprehensive 
business and human rights strategy is shared between the EU and the member states. 
As a consequence, the EU has in some areas already developed legislation of its own, 
raising issues concerning the coherence of EU and national measures and (by the 
operation of EU competence rules) limiting member states’ own powers to set binding 
standards.97 
These considerations raise the prospect of developing a European OMC process for 
business and human rights. The idea of applying the OMC to the realm of EU 
fundamental rights more broadly is not new.98 It has, however, faced two key obstacles 
                                                   
96 See, e.g., Government Offices of Sweden, note 36, 27; Finnish Ministry of Employment and the Economy, 
note 38, 16–19. 
97  See European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document on Implementing the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights – State of Play’, SWD(2015) 144 final (14 July 2015). 
98  See Olivier De Schutter, ‘The Implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights through the Open 
Method of Coordination’, NYU School of Law, Jean Monnet Working Paper 07/04 (2007) 4, 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/04/040701.rtf (accessed 13 April 2017); Stijn Smismans, ‘How 
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in the past. First, the legal powers available to the Union to develop an autonomous 
fundamental rights policy have often been contested and remain unclear.99 Second, 
member states have tended to see open coordination processes as a bureaucratic 
burden, establishing potentially costly and time-consuming implementation structures 
without clear rewards.100  
These objections seem less pressing when considering an OMC in the particular field 
of business and human rights. Regarding the competence-based obstacle, many issues 
relating to the UNGPs touch upon areas of shared competence. By giving effect to EU 
legislation on matters such as accounting standards for trans-national corporations or 
human trafficking, the member states are implementing the UNGPs under the shadow 
of EU law. The OMC could be used to monitor national implementation of EU laws that 
carry a business and human rights dimension, ensuring consistency and coherence of 
these laws throughout the European Union. Some key EU Directives already establish a 
duty of the European Commission to monitor their national implementation for this very 
reason.101 While such a coordination process would lack a distinct legal basis in the EU 
Treaties, this has not prevented the establishment of OMCs in other policy areas (such 
as social inclusion), provided open coordination is used as a mechanism to support and 
complement, rather than entirely harmonise, the laws of the member states.  
Secondly, it is questionable whether an OMC on business and human rights would 
constitute a significant additional bureaucratic burden. The vast majority of member 
states have produced, or have committed to producing, NAPs on business and human 
rights and/or CSR. Moreover, the European Commission has already dedicated 
expertise and resources to organising peer reviews on CSR and human rights. The 
                                                                                                                                                                    
to be Fundamental with Soft Procedures? The OMC and Fundamental Social Rights’, in Gráinne de Búrca and 
Bruno de Witte (eds.), Social Rights in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 217. 
99  On this historical problem see Philip Alston and J.H.H. Weiler, ‘An “Ever Closer Union” in Need of a 
Human Rights Policy: The European Union and Human Rights’, in Philip Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 2, 22–7. 
100  See, e.g., the resistance to (and temporary abolition of) the social inclusion OMC from 2010-2012, 
described in Mary Daly and Paul Copeland, ‘Poverty and Social Policy in Europe 2020: Ungovernable and 
Ungoverned’ (2014) 42:3 Policy and Politics (2014) 351. 
101  See the duty contained in EU accounting directives for the Commission to review national implementation 
prior to 2018; see Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the 
annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, 
OJ L 182/19 (26 June 2013). 
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European Council’s Working Group on Human Rights (COHOM) also monitors the 
national implementation of the UNGPs as part of its work on implementing the EU’s 
Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy.102 While a wider OMC on 
human rights may struggle to politically convince, a more focused procedure, building 
on the UNGP process, could create synergies with existing institutions. 
 
B. The Role and Added Value of an OMC for Business and Human Rights 
What would be the role and added value of an explicit OMC process? First, an OMC on 
Business and Human Rights could contribute to avoiding duplication, overlap and 
inconsistency in the implementation of different business and human rights processes at 
EU and member state level. By establishing a forum of institutionalized cooperation 
between national and EU actors in which divergent approaches to business and human 
rights can be monitored and addressed, an OMC process could be a central vehicle in 
delivering policy coherence across the European Union. 
Second, an OMC process could act as a means of identifying where further EU 
action to implement the UNGP may be necessary. While some reforms necessary to 
implement the UNGPs can be delivered via purely national action, a coordinated 
European approach may be more effective in addressing those business and human 
rights challenges with a strong cross-border element. To take one example currently 
under discussion – accounting rules for financial and labour practice disclosure for large 
companies – EU rules in this area are likely to have far greater influence in encouraging 
corporations to disclose information about human rights-related standards than 
domestic regulation (which may be perceived as creating incentives for corporations to 
re-locate to other EU member states with less intrusive standards).103 By providing a 
comparative overview of how EU member states are implementing the UNGPs, an 
                                                   
102  See European Commission, note 93, 8. 
103  This is a long-standing issue in EU human rights law – that regulatory competition between EU member 
states could lead to a race to the bottom in social or other standards, demanding EU intervention that sets ‘minimum’ 
base-line rules for inter-state competition; see Simon Deakin, ‘Regulatory Competition after Laval’ (2007–8) 10 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 581. 
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OMC process could allow actors at the European and national level to identify the 
potential and limitations of future EU action on business and human rights.104 
Third, the OMC could act as an incentive structure for member states to deliver on 
the content of their NAPs. Depending on the design of the process, an OMC procedure 
would set-out specific timetables and feedback mechanisms for NAPs on business and 
human rights. Timetabling would encourage states to make actionable commitments 
through specific deadlines (a concern mirrored in the lack of ‘SMART’ measures in 
current NAPs), exerting particular pressure on those states that have repeatedly 
promised NAPs but failed to deliver them. Feedback mechanisms, such as peer 
reviews, would also allow member states to nudge each other into following prior 
commitments outlined in the NAPs.105 Furthermore, the OMC’s history indicates some 
evidence of open coordination facilitating rights of ‘structural entry’ for NGOs and civil 
society actors in national strategies, potentially building a coalition of national actors to 
encourage governments to deliver NAP promises.106 
Fourth, the OMC could act as a space for mutual learning and the exchange of good 
practices between EU member states.107 Those peer reviews that have been conducted 
on member states’ CSR strategies demonstrate the usefulness of peer review in 
understanding common challenges (such as regulating business and human rights in 
times of austerity) and identifying emerging strategies to meet these challenges.108 A 
peer review process for business and human rights was considered by the European 
Commission in its 2011 CSR Strategy, but not followed-up in a systematic manner, in 
spite of some indications of member state support.109 As discussed in the previous 
section, the purpose of such peer would be to identify innovative strategies to meet 
                                                   
104  On this argument in relation to a broader OMC in fundamental rights, see De Schutter, note 94. 
105  A 2013 UK-based peer review of national CSR strategies offers some examples of critical scrutiny by 
government officials concerning plans of other States; see European Commission, ‘Peer Review Report: Peer 
Review on Corporate Social Responsibility’ (18 June 2013), 
ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=11471&langId=en (accessed 13 April 2017). 
106  See Dawson, note 71, 192–5; K. Jacobsson, ‘Trying to Reform the “Best Pupils in the Class”? The Open 
Method of Coordination in Sweden and Denmark’, in Zeitlin and Pochet (eds.), note 87, 107. 
107  This is one of the goals highlighted in the EU’s 2011 CSR strategy, see European Commission, note 8. 
108  See European Commission, note 103. 
109  See European Commission, note 93, 34. 
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shared problems, using the diversity of national implementation strategies regarding the 
UNGPs as an experimental advantage from which the EU as a whole may benefit. 
 
C. Designing an OMC for Business and Human Rights 
How would an OMC on business and human rights look in practice? As discussed 
above, the history of the OMC suggests that there is no ‘one size fits all’ model.110 In 
this sense, the very advantage of an open coordination process is that it need not fit 
within existing legal categories but can be shaped to meet the preferences and needs of 
the actors involved. Some core minimum requirements, however, are likely to be: 
• Establishing a common time-table for the production and revision of NAPs as part 
of a bi-annual or tri-annual cycle; 
• Tasking a specific institution (e.g., a committee of national representatives within 
the Commission or Council) with overseeing the NAP process and conducting 
state-to-state peer review; 
• Building up qualitative and quantitative indicators to allow the comparative 
benchmarking or indexing of national performance on business and human rights 
(including via existing indicator systems for CSR built by other international 
organisations);111 
• Facilitating civil society involvement, both at the EU level (e.g., via the EU’s multi-
stakeholder platform on CSR) and at the national level (e.g., through incorporating 
into EU peer review an indicator concerning national civil society participation in the 
development and review of NAPs); 
• Establishing mechanisms connecting the NAP process with the EU’s ongoing CSR 
strategy (to ensure that those responsible for designing EU initiatives in the field of 
                                                   
110  See Brigid Laffan and Colin Shaw, ‘Classifying and Mapping OMC in Different Policy Areas’, NEW-
GOV Working Paper (2005) 2. 
111  See, e.g., the UN Development Programme’s (UNDP’s) methodology for CSR country-level assessment, 
see Magdalena Kostulska, ‘UNDP Develops New Measurement Tools for Corporate Social Responsibility’ (2011), 
https://business.un.org/en/documents/9472 (accessed 13 April 2017). See also Global Reporting Initiative, ‘GRI 
Standards’, https://www.globalreporting.org/standards (accessed 13 April 2017); International Organization for 
Standardization, ‘ISO 26000 Social Responsibility’, http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/iso26000.htm (accessed 
13 April 2017). 
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business and human rights are included in the monitoring and peer-review 
process). 
The schema above provides only a first sketch of what an OMC process for business 
and human rights might look like. One should not over-estimate its potential – as much 
as the OMC’s history in the social policy field provides lessons, these are never entirely 
generalizable to other policy fields. Any OMC in the business and human rights field 
ought to be adapted significantly to this area’s distinctive features. Given the potential 
benefits of such a process, however, an OMC for business and human rights ought to 
be seriously considered. It may provide new impetus to the UNGP’s implementation, to 
which so much current academic and institutional attention is directed.112 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Whether in the EU or elsewhere, implementing the UNGPs has not proven an easy 
task. Some may even doubt wheth r the development of National Action Plans – 
supported by something like the OMC o  not – is the right approach to taking business 
and human rights forward. An alternative would be a stronger focus on ‘hard’ law 
reform. Within the European Union, the recent FRA opinion considers the possibility of 
further harmonising member state legislation to improve access to justice for victims of 
corporate-related human rights violations.113 At the global level, an allegiance of states 
from the Global South and international NGOs are pushing for the development of an 
international business and human rights treaty.114 Many stakeholders in the Global 
North, including the European Union, have voiced concerns that the international treaty 
initiative may undermine the consensus built around the UNGPs and distract resources 
from their further implementation.115 Inversely, developing an OMC on business and 
human rights could be seen as sidelining the principal goal of international legal reform.  
                                                   
112 See Thielbörger and Ackermann, note 3. 
113 See EU Fundamental Rights Agency, note 13, 24–53. 
114 See Human Rights Council, Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights, A/HRC/Res/26/9 (14 July 2014). 
115 European Union, Submission to the First Session of the Intergovernmental Working Group (6-10 July 
2015), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Session1/Pages/Session1.aspx. (accessed 13 April 
2017). 
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Meanwhile, there is an increasing recognition on both sides of the debate that ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’ law approaches can play a complementary role in preventing and redressing 
corporate-related human rights violations. In this vein, the recent FRA opinion combines 
recommendations on legal reform with an emphasis on ‘softer’ policy instruments to 
coordinate and pool national initiatives on business and human rights. This speaks to a 
long-standing discussion over the OMC in other contexts. While some have opposed 
the OMC as frustrating the goals of European legal integration, others have praised it as 
a means of building trust and cooperation at the transnational level in policy fields where 
hard law solutions initially faced obstacles and suspicion.116 An OMC on business and 
human rights should be appraised in these latter terms. Institutionalising structures of 
cooperation and exchange between states in developing and implementing NAPs does 
not reduce the space for hard law; instead, it helps to identify common challenges and 
best practices that can serve as a foundation for developing a more ambitious European 
and international legal framework. 
 Seen in this light, the recent FRA recommendation to develop an OMC on business 
and human rights offers a unique opportunity for the EU to act as a forerunner in 
international efforts to make the NAP process a success. In doing so, the EU should 
pay attention to the lessons learnt from open coordination in other policy fields. An OMC 
can act as a powerful incentive structure and engine of change, but only if it is overseen 
by a responsible central institution and supported by relevant indicators and 
benchmarks, and if it ensures the participation of the full range of actors at the national 
level ultimately responsible for translating international norms into concrete action. 
 
  
                                                   
116 See, e.g., Kerstin Jacobsson and Åsa Vifell, ‘Integration by Deliberation? On the Role of Committees in the 
Open Method of Coordination’, in Erik O. Eriksen, Christian Joerges and Jürgen Neyer (eds.) European 
Governance, Deliberation and the Quest for Democratisation (Oslo: Arena, 2003) 411. 
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